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The Risks of Playing for Time in Algeria 
Internal Strife over Key Choices after the Presidential Election 
Isabelle Werenfels 
With the re-election of the seriously ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria’s 
power elites have gained time to reach agreement over the general outline of the post-
Bouteflika era. Despite rising fears within the regime of social unrest in the absence 
of fundamental reforms, precious few among the political, military and business elites 
are in fact willing to risk reforms that would threaten their sinecures and status. Struc-
tural factors are also obstacles to change. However, the strategy of playing for time 
without tackling the issue of substantial reforms is probably riskier in the long term 
than a policy that allows for such reforms. Reform deadlocks in the strategic oil and 
gas sector, socioeconomic and ethnic conflicts and regional security challenges demand 
that key choices be made soon. Europe may not have much influence over Algeria’s 
internal decision-making processes, but a purely stability-orientated policy aligned 
with European security and energy interests is short-sighted. 
 
Since President Bouteflika was re-elected 
on 17 April with 81.4% of the vote (the offi-
cial turnout was 50.7%), there has been 
little indication of any change of direction 
in Algeria. To what extent the results were 
adjusted upwards remains unclear; the 
opposition claimed they were manipulated 
on a huge scale. Yet recent surveys by the 
Arab Barometer show that approval ratings 
of government policy quadrupled between 
2011 and 2013 from 10% to 40%. Satisfac-
tion with human rights and democracy 
issues rose from 8% to 32% over the same 
period. This reversal of opinion was pre-
sumably influenced by negative develop-
ments in Egypt, Libya and Syria during 
the so-called “Arab Spring”, as well as the 
massive increase in state subsidies and 
public sector salaries since 2011. 
The composition of the new government 
appointed in May 2014 also shows conti-
nuity with the past. Prime Minister Abdel-
malek Sellal was already in office prior to 
the election, and there were no changes to 
the heads of key ministries. One new aspect 
is the relatively high number of women in 
the government (7), among them two repre-
sentatives of ethnic minorities (Tuaregs and 
Mozabites) from southern Algeria – prob-
ably a reaction to the increasing unrest in 
that part of the country. 
After the election Bouteflika announced 
far-reaching political and economic reforms, 
as well as constitutional reform in consul-
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 tation with major political and societal 
actors. Bouteflika made similar promises 
back in 2011, when he appointed a reforms 
commission to consult with a broad spec-
trum of actors. This had modest results: 
although the state of emergency in force 
since 1992 was lifted, two key new laws – 
one governing the media and one govern-
ing associations – led to regress as well as 
progress in terms of political freedoms. 
Their main purpose was to create the im-
pression of reforms in time to prevent 
uprisings such as those in Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt. 
On May 17, proposals for constitutional 
amendments were made public, before 
being subjected to new consultations. 
They included a limitation of presidential 
mandates to two terms (Bouteflika had 
lifted the limitation in 2008) and the 
strengthening of the prime minister’s 
powers– but not the creation of the posi-
tion of a vice-president. The latter had 
been expected by many, and according to 
Algerian newspaper reports, France was 
among those pressing for this solution 
from behind the scenes in order to guar-
antee a smooth transition, as it is currently 
uncertain whether the 77-year-old president 
will see out his fourth term in office. 
The proposed amendments also anchor 
the fight against corruption in the consti-
tution, and introduce (very) minor measures 
to strengthen the separation of powers and 
to expand certain civil and political liber-
ties. With the exception of political figures 
and parties close to the president, actors 
from the entire political spectrum immedi-
ately slammed the amendments as super-
ficial, and declared their refusal to partici-
pate in the upcoming official consultations 
on the constitutional amendments. 
Emergence of New Political Camps 
The presidential election campaign revealed 
deep divisions within the Algerian elite 
which even extend across institutions and 
organisations close to the regime, such as 
the former unity party, Front de libération 
nationale (FLN) and its “satellites”, govern-
ment agencies, business lobby groups, the 
army, and last but not least the powerful 
Département du renseignement et de la 
sécurité (DRS; an umbrella for the intelli-
gence services). 
Beneath the division into pro- and anti-
Bouteflika camps lie differences over more 
fundamental questions: How can stability 
of the state and security be best guaran-
teed? What reforms are necessary to prevent 
anti-regime uprisings of the kind seen 
in the “Arab Spring” states? How can the 
Algerian system gradually be reformed 
and/or democratised from within, and 
which actor or institution should take 
the lead in doing this? 
The fact that these questions are now 
under heated discussion after a decade free 
of any serious political debate is therefore 
a positive side effect of the 2014 presiden-
tial election. Several political camps have 
emerged from this. The “mild” reformers 
rally around Ali Benflis, the president’s 
main rival who won a good 12% of the vote. 
The ex-prime minister and former Secre-
tary-General of the FLN, Algeria’s most 
powerful party, wants to reform the sys-
tem gradually from within. His agenda of 
“national renewal” focuses on enforcing 
the rule of law, fighting corruption, and 
building strong, functioning institutions. 
Benflis has gathered around him a number 
of (formerly) key generals, members of the 
FLN elite, and influential business represen-
tatives, and after the election announced 
that he would form his own party. 
Another political camp consists of actors 
who believe that the political system has 
reached its limits, and that only a process 
of transition towards democracy can avoid 
a social and political explosion. This move-
ment’s representatives called for a boycott 
of the election. 
The “National Coordination for Free-
doms and Democratic Transition” acts as 
its nucleus, bringing together prominent 
independent figures as well as a broad spec-
trum of parties, from the radical secular 
Berberophone RCD (Rassemblement pour la 
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 culture et la démocratie) to the strongest 
Islamist party, the MSP (Mouvement de la 
société pour la paix). As a first step towards 
democratic transition, the “Coordination” 
aims to hold an inclusive National Dialogue 
– a clear reflection of the Tunisian model. 
This camp, just like that of Benflis, has 
so far defied the government’s best efforts 
to co-opt it. However, the question is how 
much the reformers are actually prepared 
to risk personally, since the successful 
implementation of reforms – in particular 
their demands for the rule of law, account-
ability and serious anti-corruption measures 
– would also threaten their own collective 
and individual privileges. 
A third, more radical camp consists of 
small civil society protest movements, pre-
eminent among them the group Barakat 
(“that’s enough!”), which was formed prior 
to the election. Through direct action, such 
as sit-ins, they protest against repression 
and demand system change, thereby run-
ning the risk of repression and arrest. For 
now at least, these protest movements 
remain a phenomenon of the urban edu-
cated elite. Their demonstrations, which 
are at times tolerated and at times clamped 
down upon by the government, should not 
be confused with protests that have regu-
larly flared up on the socioeconomic peri-
pheries of the country for years. 
Essentially, the influence of the political 
opposition should not be overestimated. 
It owes its increased visibility largely to 
(recently established) independent Internet 
media platforms which allow all political 
actors, even marginal ones, a public voice. 
While this is a welcome development on 
the one hand, it ultimately distorts the true 
balance of power. 
Successful Policy of Division 
Paradoxically, one of the reasons for the 
persistence of existing power structures 
is the specific nature of pluralism in the 
authoritarian Algerian system. The range 
of political parties includes Islamist and 
conservative, as well as liberal and social 
democratic, radical secular and Berbero-
phone groups. In the several dozen Arabic 
and French language newspapers and small 
private television companies, a wide range 
of political civil society voices can be heard, 
often critical of politicians, the president, 
and recently even the head of the intel-
ligence service. 
In Algeria, then (unlike in Tunisia or 
Libya prior to the upheavals), there exist 
certain valves through which to release 
political pressure. Criticism can be ex-
pressed, but it usually proves futile. There 
are no coordinated campaigns, for instance 
by the several dozen Arabic and French lan-
guage newspapers or major Internet plat-
forms. The apparent diversity of the media 
is, more than anything, a reflection of the 
conflict between various powerful clans, 
which publicly discredit one another. 
Moreover, among the multiplicity of 
parties many of the political actors are 
largely irrelevant. This is because the gov-
ernment exploits the pluralistic framework 
to divide and weaken groups it does not 
approve of by co-optation, repression, or 
fomenting competition. 
A prime example is the successful frag-
mentation of the (legal) Islamist parties. At 
the 2012 elections the Islamists performed 
even worse than they had five years before. 
For the 2014 presidential election the 
strongest Islamist party, the MSP, which is 
connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, did 
not even put forward a candidate. This deci-
sion is likely to have been influenced by 
developments in Egypt, where the Muslim 
brothers have undergone harsh persecution 
since the summer of 2013. 
One of the main reasons why the Alge-
rian policy of division works so well is that 
it resonates with the population, which is 
fragmented along regional, linguistic and 
ethnic lines. This fragmentation in politics 
and society is a distinct obstacle to reform 
because it impedes efforts to find a broad 
and lasting consensus among the elite. 
Whether the new “Coordination” will sur-
vive for long after the election is question-
able. At the beginning of the “Arab Spring” 
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 in 2011, a similar coalition fell apart after 
just a few weeks under the regime’s policy 
of division and due to internal differences. 
Major Obstacles to Reform 
Inherent in the System 
The great staying power of the old system, 
and the huge obstacles to reform in Algeria 
generally can be seen with reference to key 
political and economic structures and inter-
ests connected with them, as well as soci-
etal dynamics. 
Competing power bases in a clientelist 
system. Until Bouteflika took office in 1999, 
Algeria’s fate had been controlled by active 
and retired military officers. As the first 
civilian President of the Republic, Boute-
flika succeeded in gradually reducing the 
power of influential officers by restaffing 
and restructuring the army and intelli-
gence service. The president thus built up 
his own power base consisting of family 
members, people from his home region, 
and long-standing acquaintances. Boute-
flika’s youngest brother, Said, is an ex-
tremely important powerbroker behind 
the scenes, and was the target of particu-
larly aggressive attacks during the election 
campaign. 
The president’s main adversary is the 
DRS intelligence service chief, Mohamed 
“Toufik” Mediène, who has been its director 
since 1990. Reliable information about the 
quality of the relationship between “Toufik” 
and the president is hard to come by, but 
press reports and insider information sug-
gest that, despite having reached a modus 
vivendi, power struggles repeatedly break 
out between them. Key reasons for this are 
economic interests of various powerful 
clans (some within the military) and their 
clients in politics, business, government 
institutions and even civil society. 
In 2010 the DRS uncovered a corruption 
scandal in the state-run oil and gas empire, 
Sonatrach, involving people close to the 
president. Bouteflika was consequently 
forced to cut ties with loyal companions 
such as the Energy Minister. After a restruc-
turing of the security services in 2013, 
during which the task of fighting corrup-
tion was removed from the remit of the 
DRS, investigations against the president’s 
camp came to a halt. In view of the fact 
that senior military officers have had per-
sonal interests in the oil and gas sector 
for decades, and that the influence of the 
president in this sector has been increasing, 
anti-corruption is unlikely to have been 
the genuine motivation in either case. 
Competing interests in a thoroughly 
clientelist system not only explain the 
political stalemate of Bouteflika’s third 
term in office; they are also one of the 
reasons why it is so difficult to change the 
system from within. Despite all the rifts, it 
is in the unanimous interest of the various 
power elites that the current unwritten 
political and economic rules of the game 
should continue. If serious pressure for 
change is exerted from outside the regime, 
the various powerful clans will close ranks. 
Bouteflika’s re-election was almost certainly 
a case in point, which bought the power 
elite time to negotiate a succession plan 
beneficial to their vested interests. 
Military seen as a cornerstone. Another 
problem with regard to reform is the status 
of the army – whether perceived or real – as 
the backbone of the system. In Bouteflika’s 
first term in office political elites still criti-
cised the army’s interference in politics. 
In 2003 the then chief of the general staff 
announced the withdrawal of the army 
from politics and its neutrality during elec-
tions. 
Paradoxically, in the 2014 election cam-
paign political actors demanded a more 
active role for the army in politics and 
defended the intelligence service. Mouloud 
Hamrouche – a figurehead of Algerian re-
form forces, who drove forward the demo-
cratic opening as prime minister from 1988 
to 1991 – called upon military leaders to 
take on a key role in the transition process. 
Other actors indirectly called on the army 
to prevent Bouteflika’s re-election. 
Most astonishing of all was the support 
shown for the intelligence chief by virtually 
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 all political camps after he was directly and 
publicly attacked by the FLN in February 
2014. Even democratically-minded actors 
criticised these attacks on a “central insti-
tution” as unjustified. And yet the FLN 
leader had only complained of what many 
of the political elite (who were now scream-
ing in defiance) had been criticising private-
ly for years – namely, the presence of the 
DRS in all political institutions and com-
mittees and its business dealings. 
These various examples all point to the 
fact that Algeria has a “deep state” (a state 
within a state) which commands respect 
and has a determining influence on any 
changes. 
The idea that a strong army intervening 
in politics can really be a reforming factor 
is doubtful in view of Algerian history. 
When it became clear that the Islamists had 
won a first round of democratic elections in 
1991 the army staged a coup which marked 
the beginning of a civil war. The develop-
ments in Egypt since the start of the “Arab 
Spring” also show how difficult democrati-
sation is under conditions of a “deep state” 
with the military at its core. 
A security and stability-oriented popula-
tion. The still fragile security situation in 
Algeria is an additional obstacle to change. 
It favours restrictions to political freedoms, 
such as freedom of assembly and the right 
to demonstrate, and reduces the willing-
ness of a population traumatised by the 
civil war of the 1990s to embark on any 
experiments. Thus, the security situation 
has also contributed to Bouteflika’s re-elec-
tion. The president is still commonly ac-
cepted to be the figure who restored calm 
to Algeria after the civil war. 
At the same time the power elites profit 
indirectly from the continued activities of 
small jihadist groups within Algeria, and 
from the growing presence of transnational 
militant groups in the Sahel and Libya with 
close connections to Algeria. One such group 
was responsible for the attack on the Ain 
Amenas gas facility in early 2013. 
After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” 
in neighbouring countries, the government 
raised the spectre of destabilisation. Mem-
bers of the elite and media organisations 
close to the government warned against 
political uprising, which could pave the 
way for (radical) Islamists or even foreign 
intervention, as in Libya. During the 2014 
election also, the president’s camp stirred 
up fears of fresh chaos. They branded 
the main rival, Ali Benflis, as a dangerous 
troublemaker, even a terrorist, and blamed 
him for acts of sabotage connected with the 
election. 
As a result of this government policy and 
these collective societal fears, a discourse 
of careful and gradual reforms has become 
widespread even among the opposition. In 
surveys by the Arab Barometer, 78% of Alge-
rians questioned in 2013 were in favour of 
gradual rather than drastic and immediate 
reforms, whereas in 2011 just over 54% 
were in favour. This preference has allowed 
the government to limit itself to cosmetic 
reforms and delay fundamental changes to 
the system indefinitely. 
The curse of oil and gas income. Despite 
the turbulence in neighbouring countries, 
the Algerian leadership has been able to get 
away with making minimal reforms in part 
because of the country’s rich oil and gas 
resources. Apart from the occasional drop, 
the price of fossil fuels has been exception-
ally high since the mid-2000s, providing 
the opportunity to finance large scale state 
infrastructure projects, and thereby create 
jobs. Less productive state economic sectors 
could thus be cross-subsidised. Above all, 
the income from oil and gas has made it 
possible, to some extent at least, to buy 
social peace. Under the influence of the 
“Arab Spring” in 2011 the government 
increased subsidies by approximately 60%, 
and public sector salaries by over 9% in 
2012 alone. 
The abovementioned surveys by the Arab 
Barometer have also shown that in 2013 
twice as many respondents (66%) assessed 
the economic development as positive as 
compared with 2011 (32%). Bouteflika’s 
government has thus managed to gain a 
certain legitimacy through providing wel-
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 fare benefits. As long as Algeria has enough 
liquidity to minimise unrest through the 
judicious distribution of gifts, the domestic 
pressure for reform on the government will 
probably remain limited. 
The institutionalisation of revolutionary 
legitimacy. Another hurdle for reforms 
comes from the revolutionary legitimacy 
of the political system. In Algeria the gen-
eration of the revolution is still in power. 
Bouteflika, “Toufik” Mediène, as well as 
the chief of the general staff and Bouteflika 
confidante Gaid Salah – all are veterans of 
the war of independence. 
The transition to the next generation, 
which has no revolutionary legitimacy, will 
not be easy. This is not so much because the 
new elite will have to legitimise itself in a 
different way, but rather because the mys-
tique of the revolution is associated with 
pecuniary privileges enjoyed not only by 
the elite. The state rewards participation 
in the struggle for independence, among 
other things, with licences to drive taxis 
and import cars, and with direct pensions 
for ex-revolutionaries and benefits for their 
surviving dependants. In the 2014 budget 
almost as much money is allocated to 
the “Ministry of Former Fighters” as to the 
Ministry for Higher Education, approxi-
mately equivalent to 75% of what is spent 
on the healthcare sector. 
The so-called revolutionary family is 
growing steadily. In the 1990s, organisa-
tions for victims of Islamist violence took 
their place alongside historical organisa-
tions and institutions such as the FLN, 
the association of former fighters, or the 
umbrella organisation of unions close to 
the state (UGTA). In addition, influential 
lobby groups have been formed whose aim 
is to transfer revolutionary legitimacy, and 
its associated privileges, to the children 
of “martyrs” and also to those of regular 
fighters. 
Consequently an entire segment of 
society is dependent on the drip-feed of the 
state’s provision of a “revolutionary rent”. 
Members of the revolutionary family are 
naturally opposed to reforms. They only 
stand to lose if the system ceases to be 
revolutionary and becomes democratically 
legitimised. It is significant that Ali Benflis, 
who is too young to have fought in the war 
of independence, led a two-pronged cam-
paigned in the 2014 election: on the one 
hand he publicised his reform agenda, and 
on the other hand he stressed his identity 
(and thereby his legitimacy) as the son of a 
“martyr”. 
The Risks of Playing for Time 
In the short term there is plenty of evidence 
to suggest that Algeria’s power elites can 
continue to stoke internal conflict and delay 
reforms for some time in the face of limited 
pressure. However, growing national and 
international challenges demand setting 
the course for the future now, amid in-
creasing signs that the system is reaching 
the limits of its ability to solve problems. 
This is particularly true in the strategic 
energy sector, and could have far-reaching 
consequences. 
The outlook for the oil and gas sector, 
which generated over 98% of export income 
in 2012 and almost a quarter of GDP, is not 
good in the medium term. Although Algeria 
has large reserves of gas in particular, oil 
production has been stagnating for several 
years and gas production is decreasing. One 
reason for this is the slow pace of extrac-
tion and infrastructure projects, which is 
attributable to waning interest on the part 
of foreign investors. A protectionist law, 
which rules that foreign investors must 
work with an Algerian majority partner, 
along with poor legal security and high 
levels of corruption, make Algeria unattrac-
tive for direct foreign investment. 
Furthermore, the shale gas revolution 
has changed the global market for gas to 
Algeria’s disadvantage (up until the Cri-
mean crisis, at least). In any case, Algeria 
will not be able to deliver more exports in 
the foreseeable future, as national energy 
consumption, which rose by more than 
50% from 2002 to 2012, continues to soar, 
and cannot always be met. Blackouts in 
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 Algeria’s cities were not uncommon in 
2013. 
All this will have a negative impact on 
the national budget. The International 
Monetary Fund has urged a reduction of 
subsidies and structural reform to reduce 
dependence on oil and gas, boost the pri-
vate sector, and create urgently needed jobs. 
So far Algiers has complied only limit-
edly with this advice and still meets chal-
lenges with its well-known policy of dis-
tribution. This may keep fires at bay when 
trouble ignites, but it cannot extinguish 
them. 
In 2013, in the once calm oil and gas 
rich provinces of southern Algeria, a strong 
protest movement was formed by unem-
ployed people who want some of the coun-
try’s wealth to flow back into their region – 
similar socioeconomic and political im-
balance led to the uprising in Tunisia in 
late 2010. 
In Algeria, the government is now begin-
ning to pay the price for decades of neglect 
of the Saharan provinces, which are prac-
tically unrepresented among the power 
elite. The appointment of two new cabinet 
members from the south in 2014 will do 
little to change this. 
A further risk is that southern Algeria 
will become more socially and economi-
cally disconnected, and the problems of 
the Sahel states will extend deeper into that 
part of the country. As far as smuggling 
and the activities of jihadist groups are 
concerned, national borders in the Sahara 
region no longer seem to exist. The con-
tinued marginalisation of southern Algeria 
is likely to encourage such activity. 
Moreover, ethnic and ethno-religious 
conflicts are on the rise, mostly over ques-
tions of distribution. Disputes between 
Arabs and Mozabites in the town of Ghar-
daia have cost eight people their lives since 
the end of 2013. The mostly Berber-inhab-
ited region of Kabylie in the east of the 
country is still a centre of chronic socio-
cultural and socioeconomic protest. Here, 
a wing of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb 
and, increasingly, criminal networks are 
undermining the state’s monopoly on the 
use of force. 
For now, on the whole, protests by the 
political opposition and by those on the 
socioeconomic peripheries remain separate 
events. However, if these movements joined 
together, the potential for mobilisation and 
pressure on the regime would increase con-
siderably. 
Another factor that could increase the 
pressure for reform are regional spillover 
effects. If neighbouring Tunisia not only 
becomes more democratic, but also under-
goes an economic recovery, and if Morocco 
progresses with gradual reforms, then in 
the medium term the Algerian people will 
probably be more willing to experiment 
with political reform – especially given that 
in a few years, a generation with no direct 
experience of the civil war will be coming 
of age. 
Algeria’s rulers face different types of 
challenges, all of which suggest that 
legitimacy through the welfare state as a 
substitute for democratic legitimacy has 
reached its limit – or soon will. If the power 
elites cannot agree on even basic economic 
reforms, and continue to play for time, this 
will increase the chances of regime change 
forced from “the street” – with a highly 
uncertain outcome. 
Beyond Spectatorship – 
Options for the EU? 
The consequences of renewed destabilisa-
tion in Algeria as a result of reform dead-
locks would also be felt in Europe, for 
instance in the form of increased irregular 
migration, or shortages in the energy sup-
ply. On the other hand, positive develop-
ments in Algeria would present opportuni-
ties for Europe: with a population of nearly 
38 million (45% under 25 years of age) it is 
an attractive market, and in future could 
even provide Europe with workers it will 
need due to demographic changes. 
It is therefore in the interests of the EU 
that Algeria should soon implement funda-
mental reforms. After the election, the Euro-
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 pean Commission once again encouraged 
such reforms. 
At the same time, Europe’s opportunities 
for action are very limited. Algeria does 
not tolerate any interference in its internal 
affairs, especially when it comes to sensitive 
areas such as human rights and political 
freedoms. This is also the reason why nego-
tiations over a plan of action under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy have been 
delayed for so long. 
However, there are now signs that 
Algeria’s interest in closer cooperation is 
increasing – not least because its neigh-
bours Tunisia and Morocco are steadily 
moving closer to the EU. It is the express 
wish of Algeria to cooperate on security 
issues – particularly with Germany, as these 
relations are not burdened by historical fac-
tors. Such cooperation makes sense, both 
for confidence-building and in view of 
instability in the Sahel and Libya. However, 
care should be taken that Germany and 
other European countries do not reinforce 
repressive authoritarian structures in 
Algeria in the name of counter-terrorism. 
Instead they should contribute to reforms 
in the security sector beyond just providing 
equipment and specific training measures. 
European states and civil society actors 
could also make a small contribution to 
political opening: they could substantially 
intensify communications and interactions 
with a broad spectrum of Algeria’s civil 
society representatives and political reform 
forces, and encourage dialogue among 
the various Algerian actors. Neighbouring 
Tunisia may not have Europe to thank for 
the explosive development of civil society 
and its constructive role in the aftermath 
of the revolution; however, the transfer of 
know-how and cooperation with civil soci-
ety actors, which began under difficult 
conditions at the time of Ben-Ali’s regime, 
probably helped to pave the way for it. 
In Algeria, too, this form of cooperation 
would be likely to yield results in the 
medium term. 
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